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I. Introduction
When then LDP secretary general Ichiro Ozawa suggested in his 1994 book 
“Blueprint for a New Japan” the idea of Japan becoming a “normal state” ( futsu 
no kuni ), it triggered a debate that is ongoing to this day. What Ozawa meant by 
normal was a country that would be able to develop and pursue a foreign policy 
that was based on its own preferences and necessities, but in Ozawa’s view 
would mostly mean one that would often be pursued through or in cooperation 
with the United Nations.
Different authors have taken up this question and have debated what kind of 
“normal” state Japan could become, and to what degree it could make its own 
policy decisions, sometime with, sometimes without the United States.
This paper asks two questions: (1) Will Japan gradually develop into a 
“normal” state that is able and willing to use military force when it considers 
it necessary? And (2) what are the models for this kind of development? Will 
Japan go through a similar development Germany went through in the last 
twenty years? Might it, therefore, be better to find a different term for this 
development, such as “new power”?
Public opinion and constitutional constraints are widely considered the two 
major factors that constraint Japan’s foreign and defense policy and prevent 
Japan from taking over larger international responsibilities. These factors are 
important to consider in this regard, because public opinion and the memory of 
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6World War II also strongly influence the debate about Germany’s international 
role. However, both countries went through changes of their defense posture 
and became more involved in humanitarian interventions and so-called “out-of-
area” missions. Many of these changes were made possible because of gradual 
changes in public acceptance of these missions triggered by specific events, 
but also because of the increasing influence of norm entrepreneurs such as 
influential politicians or intellectuals.
In order to evaluate the changes over the last decades, this paper uses 
a comparative method and uses the United States as well as a selection of 
European countries. The comparison with the United States and Europe allows 
us to assess whether the above mentioned constraints are beginning to weaken 
and Japan will become more like the United Kingdom, as expressed in the 2006 
Nye/Armitage Report, or whether the policy preferences in Japan resemble more 
those in continental Europe. The latter might then indicate that Japan might 
increasingly develop a foreign and defense policy which, in principle, considers 
itself a close ally of the United States (as most European countries in NATO) but 
which might also be able to develop a more independent stance along the lines 
of Germany and France.
Germany and Japan have both been called “civilian powers” (Mauss), 
because their foreign policy focus is predominantly on trade and to some 
degree development assistance, but not military power. Around the time Ichiro 
Ozawa demanded a rethinking of Japan’s international role and his cry for a 
“normal state” (1994), a similar debate about the “normalization” of Germany 
and its new international role after the End of the Cold War was in full swing 
among German and European scholars and policy practitioners (Tackle 2002, 
Bach 1999). During the Cold War, Germany’s foreign and defense policy 
was, as was Japan’s, constrained by several factors. Germany shares with 
Japan the constitutional constraints, a strongly anti-militarist public opinion, 
a parliamentary system with either coalition governments (Germany) or weak 
or often short-term administrations (Japan), the presence of American troops 
on their soil, and a close alliance with the United States. The German postwar 
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foreign and defense policy has often been described as a “German special path” 
(Deutscher Sonderweg). While Germany developed to become the third largest 
economy in the world and the cornerstone of European integration, it differed 
from the United Kingdom and France in that sending troops abroad was not 
a viable option (and could hardly be imaged by most Germans), because the 
German public had a strong preference for diplomatic solutions.
II. Similarities and Differences between Germany and Japan
2. 1  Domestic Structure
One of the weaknesses of Japanese foreign policy making is the frequent 
change of prime ministers and cabinet members. Just in the last 10 years, 
between 2002 and June 2012, Japan had seven prime ministers, eleven foreign 
ministers; ten defense ministers (January 2007 and June 2012), and eight heads 
of the Defense Agency (2002 to 2006). In the same time period, Germany had 
only two chancellors, three foreign ministers, and four defense ministers, while 
the United States had only two presidents, three foreign secretaries and three 
defense secretaries. In addition to the relatively short period in office in Japan 
(average for foreign ministers: 12 month, average for defense ministers: about 7 
month), most were appointed without or with very little expertise or experience 
in the area of foreign affairs. Since the foundation of the (West-) German 
Ministry of Defense in 1955 until 2012, there have been fifteen ministers of 
defense, many of them serving for four or more years in that position. Since the 
foundation of the Japanese Defense Agency in 1952, seventy-two politicians 
served as head of the agency, and since the change into the Ministry of Defense 
in January 2007, it has seen ten ministers come and go.
A second structural factor that prevented a more independent defense 
policy was certainly the fact that until December 2006, matters of defense were 
organized within the Defense Agency, delegated under the Prime Ministers 
Office. Since January 2007, Japan has a Defense Ministry with its own budget, 
a defense minister and secretary of state. Germany had a full Defense Ministry 
since 1955.
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8Japan is a parliamentary democracy; hence the prime minister is elected 
by a majority of the members of the Diet. This makes the prime minister 
depended on constant support from his political party, and, therefore, limits his 
political maneuverability. Japanese prime ministers have traditionally also been 
the president of the LDP, which gives them a stronghold in the party and in 
government. However, between 1955 and the early 1990s, the decision-making 
process about the party president and hence prime minister has been far from 
transparent, and rather the result of backroom negotiations between inner-party 
faction leaders. After the first election loss in 38 years and time in opposition 
between 1993 and 1994, the selection process was reformed, and in the last 
decade LDP party presidents and hence prime ministers have been elected in 
a variety of ways, including an almost primary-type race in the case of Prime 
Minister Koizumi in 2001. 
Traditionally, foreign policy has long been a policy area that was dominated 
by bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry. There were only a few Japanese prime ministers that came to 
office with a clear foreign policy agenda, and initially, Koizumi was not one 
of them. His core policy objective was domestic, namely the privatization 
of the postal service. Apart from a few exceptions, the role of the prime 
minister in the Japanese political system has been rather weak. Only a few 
months after Koizumi had been elected the terrorist attacks of 9/11 happened, 
which fundamentally changed Koizumi’s foreign policy outlook and Japan’s 
relationship to the United States.
Another institutional aspect important in this regard is the strenghtening 
of the power and influence of the cabinet office within the governing system. 
Until the mid-1990s, the prime minister was just the head of a relatively small 
prime ministers office and heavily relied on policy expertise from the respective 
ministries. With the new cabinet law enacted in 1996 under Prime Minister 
Hashimoto, the cabinet office was elevated and was put at the center of the 
governing system. The prime minister, if they had the personal ability and party 
backing, could now perform much more effectively and follow at least some of 
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their own policy objectives. Koizumi was the first who could effectively use all 
this new power of the cabinet office and push the decision to deploy Japanese 
SDF soldiers to Iraq against strong public as well as parliamentary opposition 
(Shinoda 2007).
A major constrained of Japanese foreign policy has certainly been the 
Japanese constitution of 1947. The so-called war-renouncing article 9 prohibits 
Japan from ever developing a “war potential” and interpreted literally, would 
have prohibited Japan from having its own defense infrastructure. Since 1952, 
when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and joined the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, the Japanese government interpreted the constitution not as 
literally as it is written. Based on the rights given to member states by the United 
Nations Charta, Japan does not think that article 9 of the constitution limits the 
right of self-defense. Henceforth, the major political force in Japanese politics 
since 1955, the LDP, supports this interpretation. Since the mid 1950s, Japan 
has actively set up so-called Self Defense Forces whose only role was to defend 
the Japanese homeland. Since the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 
1952 and particularly after is first revision in 1960, the U.S. government has 
frequently urged Japan to become more actively involved not only in its own 
defense but also for regional security in East Asia. However, a strong sense 
of anti-militarism has long prevented the Japanese government to extend its 
security commitment outside its borders. 
As a lesson of German militarism and expansionism of the first half of 
the 20th century, the German Constitution (Basic Law) includes Article 26, 
which calls all activities that could “disturb peaceful relations between nations, 
especially to prepare for aggressive war” unconstitutional. Although the German 
Constitution does not question the constitutionality of Self Defense Forces or the 
German Army (Bundeswehr), it still is a forceful reminder and guarantee to the 
world, that Germany is aware of its militarist history and is determined to never 
be the cause of aggressive militarist policies again.
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2. 2  International Factors
Japan and Germany enjoy an overwhelmingly positive image in the 
world. In the last three years, a BBC World Service opinion poll (BBC World 
Service, 2006-2012) Germany and Japan were considered the two countries 
that respondents in participating countries considered to have a rather positive 
influence in the world. In the most recent survey published in May 2012, Japan 
was considered to have a positive influence in the world by an average of 58% 
of the respondents, while an average of 56% shared the same opinion about 
Germany. This positive image could be used by these two countries to further 
their soft power and as a mediator in world affairs. The only two countries 
where Japan’s image is overwhelmingly negative are the Republic of Korea (58% 
negative) and the PR China (63% negative).
Germany and Japan also share a strong dependence on trade exports. This 
has brought both countries unprecedented wealth and made them the second 
and third largest economies in the word, bit it also influences and sometimes 
limits their foreign policy decisions. Both countries suffer from a lack of 
natural resources (Japan even more so than Germany) and the need to establish 
friendly and cooperate relationships with oil exporting countries in the Middle 
East. Japan developed a so-called omni-directional foreign policy that strictly 
distinguished between security policy and economic and trade policy. 
Nevertheless, a major difference between Germany and Japan is certainly 
their different levels of regional integration. While Germany has been one of 
the founding members of the EEC and is now a core member of the EU, Japan 
is not integrated in any viable form of regional network. Apart from the annual 
ASEAN+3 meetings, Japan’s focus has been on establishing bilateral relations 
including so-called economic partnership agreements (EPA), initially with 
a small number of ASEAN member states, and in 2008, with ASEAN itself. 
Nevertheless, Japan is not integrated into any political regional organization 
in the way Germany is. Japan can always negotiate from the position of 
an economically more advanced country, but other than with the U.S. or at 
G8 meetings, has comparatively little international experience in political 
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negotiations dealing with highly conflicting issues.
Unlike the close relationship that Germany has developed with former 
enemy states such as France and the UK, Japan does not have anything 
comparable as a basis to build a regional network. Public opinion in these areas 
is very clear. While the large majority of Japanese had strong sympathies and 
felt very close to China in the 1980s  (between 50 and 70% felt close to China), 
the level fell to around 50% in 1990 and remained there until 2002. From 2003, 
hence shortly after Prime Minister Koizumi had taken over power and triggered 
Chinese anger with his visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the feeling of closeness rapidly 
declined from around 50% to just over 20%, while negative feelings increased 
from about 50% (2003) to 77% (2010). The assessment of Japan-China relations 
developed in similar ways. In 2002, 46% thought they were good, in 2010 only 
8% held this opinion, while 88% had a rather negative impression of Japan-
China relations. Similar, but not quite as extreme developments can be observed 
when Japanese assess their feeling towards Korea and their assessment of Japan-
Korea relations (Government of Japan, Public Opinion Survey about Foreign 
Affairs, respective years)
In terms of their security arrangements, Germany and Japan are in two 
very different situations that give them different degrees of maneuverability. 
Since 1952, Japan is in a bilateral security treaty with the United States, while 
Germany joined the multilateral collective defense alliance NATO in 1955. 
Being a member of a multilateral alliance gives Germany more diplomatic 
maneuverability and the possibility to negotiate with individual member 
countries, particularly with France. The case of the run up to the Iraq War in 
2003 has demonstrated that since the end of the Cold War, individual members 
have much more freedom to come to their own conclusions about questions 
whether to join the United States in their attack against Iraq than during the Cold 
War, when fear of a possible attack and the requirement to keep the show unity 
was much stronger than it is today.
Japan, on the other hand, is in some way trapped in a typical alliance 
dilemma, between entrapment and abandonment. During the Cold War and 
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continuing into the 2000s, one of the most important factors that prevented 
Japan from extending its international engagement and profile was the 
constitution and public resentment. Soon after the constitution with its article 9 
had been announced in 1947, the first Prime Minister Yoshida and the American 
government realized that such strict wording might have been a mistake and that 
it limits Japan’s role in playing a role in the Western alliance from the Korean 
War and throughout the Cold War. There have been many initiatives to revise the 
constitution, but not even the most popular or influential prime ministers were 
able to push the debate to a point that such a revision might have been feasible, 
and would have gotten the necessary public support in a referendum. Under 
Prime Minister Koizumi the LDP and later also the opposition parties have set 
up constitutional study commissions. After some public opinion surveys during 
the late Koizumi administration showed increasing support for a constitutional 
revision, between 2007 and 2012, support for constitutional change has declined 
again to levels below or far below parity.
III. Major Security Developments for Germany and Japan
3. 1  Germany: Kosovo─The watershed event
Germany also did not actively participate in the Gulf War (1991) but chose 
to support the UN sanctioned mission only through financial contributions. 
Germany, just like Japan, was accused of checkbook diplomacy, which, just 
like in Japan, triggered a debate first between security analysts and politicians, 
but gradually also among the general public about Germans future international 
role. Only three years later, in 1993, Germany sent the first German troops to an 
“out of area” (meaning NATO area) mission to support US troops in Somalia. 
In the following years, the German army went through a reform process. It had 
to adapt to the changing security environment and gradually shifted from a 
defensive land-based army to a flexible intervention force.
In 1999, the German parliament, for the first time in postwar history, 
decided that the Bundeswehr would participate in a military humanitarian 
intervention to liberate Kosovo Albanians from an anticipated genocide. German 
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Air force planes were sent into combat mission as a part of the NATO mission, 
and after 9/11 German troops participated in the “Operation Enduring Freedom” 
in Afghanistan.
Because of the Holocaust, Germans are particularly sensitive when they 
suspect the possibility of genocide. While liberating countries from unjust 
and undemocratic regimes is met with a lot of skepticism and questions of 
means and ends, international law, and the general justification to use military 
means, the word “genocide” triggers a stronger sense of restitution. President 
Clinton called the situation in Kosovo a genocide and directly compared it to 
the Holocaust. This might be similar to the strong sense among Germans to 
help political refugees, which is why it was not only put prominently into the 
German constitution of 1949, but also made German a country with one of the 
highest levels of refugee inflow in the postwar period. Japan does not have such 
provisions and accepts only a negligible number of refugees.
However, the core point that I want to raise here is that the decision to 
send German fighter and reconnaissance airplanes into Kosovo in February 
1999 was not made by a long-standing conservative party (CDU) under the 
Atlanticist Helmut Kohl, but under a left-of-center Social Democrat - Green 
Party coalition government. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister 
and leading Green Party politician defended this decision as necessary to 
prevent a possible genocide and more bloodshed in Kosovo against very strong 
opposition within his own party. Fischer was accused as a betrayer of pacifist 
and non-militarist party principles and was even physically attacked at a party 
conference. Nevertheless, to this day, he defends this decision as necessary and 
he certainly considers this a watershed decision in postwar German foreign 
policy. Germany became a player defending humanitarian principles, and it gave 
Germany the liberty to make future decisions on its own terms. This became 
clear, when under the same Foreign Minister Fischer and Chancellor Schroeder, 
Germany rejected any participation in the Iraq War. Its former participation in 
Kosovo brought Germany respect and in my interpretation, made it a “normal” 
Western state, because it can now decide more freely whether to join or not to 
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join humanitarian or active peacekeeping missions.
3. 2  Japan: The Iraq Mission ─ the first watershed event
While Germany resisted any participation in the Iraq War (2003/4), Prime 
Minister Koizumi felt the necessity to demonstrate to the United States, and to 
some degree the world community, that Japan was not the country that would 
always say “no”, but if it chooses to, it could indeed actively support U.S.-led 
allied mission by sending SDF Forces. Paul Midford (2008, 2011) has written 
extensively about the steps Koizumi took to increase support to a level that 
once the troops had arrived in Iraq, at least half of the Japanese would support 
the mission. After the November 2003 news conference where Koizumi made 
the mistake to stress alliance obligation too strongly, the mission statement was 
revised to focus exclusively on humanitarian aspects of this mission. 
VI. Japan: Increased acceptance of a larger international role
4. 1  Public Opinion about Japans international role
Over the last decade, support for a larger international role of Japan has 
increased among the general public. In 2012, more than 60% of Japanese 
wanted their government to become more active in the peaceful solution of 
international or regional problems and conflicts including the deployment of 
Japanese personnel. In the same survey 56% demanded a more active approach 
towards environmental problems and global warming, 41% more efforts towards 
disarmament and nonproliferation (Government of Japan, Public Opinion 
about Foreign Affairs 2012). This shows that Japanese strongly support further 
involvement of Japan internationally, which, if necessary, might also include 
support for military-led humanitarian interventions. 
4. 2  Support for PKO Missions
Germany began its first UN PKO Mission after the end of the Cold War. 
However, the German public was not ready to send German troops abroad, 
not even in blue barrette missions. This changed in 1991, when the German 
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parliament decided to send German troops to a UN PKO mission against a 
lot of protest and public debate. In the following years, Germany successfully 
participated in a number of PKO missions and has currently about 250 (May 
2012) soldiers deployed in U.N. missions.
After not being able to send troops to participate in the liberation of Kuwait 
in 1991 and after being accused of checkbook diplomacy, Japan was quite 
quick in drafting and passing the PKO Law in 1992, which enabled Japan to 
participate in peacekeeping missions first in Cambodia and then in a number 
of missions in the following years. Although the actual number of SDF troops 
that were deployed long remained rather small, but in a similar range as those 
of Germany or Great Britain, the symbolic value for Japan and the Japanese 
should not be underestimated. In late 2011, slightly more than half of Japanese 
supported a continuation of Japans engagement in UNPKO activities on current 
levels, while another third even is in favor of extending them (Government of 
Japan, Public Opinion about Foreign Affairs 2012). This is a clear indication that 
the Japanese public strongly supports Japanese PKO activities and might be one 
reason why in mid 2012, almost 500 SDF forces serve in UN PKO operation, 
compared to less than 300 from Germany and the UK.
Because the UN peacekeeping missions were quite successful and were 
reported in both countries as necessary and as an important factor to provide 
peace and stability in other parts of the world, general public acceptance and 
then support in Japan and Germany for these missions gradually increased. In 
2006 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer West 2006), about two-third 
(66.1%) of Germans expressed support for military peacekeeping missions. In 
the same survey, 63% also criticized that the German army participates in too 
many missions.
V. Civil-Military Relations in Japan and Germany
5. 1  Confidence in Armed Forces and Government
After a short period in the early 1950s, where Japan as well as Germany 
saw strong resistance against joining the US-Japan Security Treaty and the 
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formation of the Self Defense Forces, Germany saw similar resistance against 
the formation of the Bundeswehr and the immediate joining of NATO ten years 
after the end of World War II in 1955.
Just like in Japan, general acceptance about the existence of the Bundeswehr 
increased over the next decades. However, the debate about a possible 
nuclearization of Germany in the 1960s, protest against the US war against 
Vietnam, the NATO double-track decision adopted by the German parliament in 
1983 to increase the number of Pershing Missiles in Europe including Germany 
all led to major protests against these government decisions but not against the 
Bundeswehr as a self-defense force. Comparative data in 2005 show, however, 
some difference in the confidence in each countries armed forces. While 75% 
of the Japanese have a lot of confidence in the SDF (“a great deal” and “quite a 
lot”), only half (50%) of the German public shares this level of confidence (World 
Value Survey 2005-2008). 
Trust or confidence in armed forces has significantly improved in both 
countries since the end of the Cold War, which can certainly be attributed to 
the fact that armies are no longer considered as war potential or as a symbol of 
militarism. The reason for the broader public acceptance of the Bundeswehr 
and the SDF can certainly be attributed to their successful involvement in UN 
peacekeeping missions, humanitarian and reconstruction missions, or, as in 
the case of Kosovo, to prevent a possible genocide. Nevertheless, Germans are 
still more critical of their army than the Japanese are. While only about one 
quarter of the general public in Japan and Germany expressed trust (“trust a lot” 
plus “somewhat trust”) in their armed forces by the end of the Cold War, this 
significantly increased in both countries, but much stronger in Japan. Between 
1995 and 2005, about half of the German population was confident, but the share 
increased to 75% in Japan in 2005 (World Value Survey 1995 and 2005-2008). 
In early 2012, 90% of Japanese have a generally positive impression of the 
Japanese SDF (Government of Japan, Public Opinion about Self Defense Forces 
and Security Issues, 2012). This demonstrates that distrust in armed forces or a 
lack of appreciation of their activities over the last 15 years is no longer a reason 
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that would constrain international involvement of the two armed forces. 
5. 2  Low willingness to fight in war in Germany and Japan
Another factor that still severely constraints Germans and Japanese ability 
to use their armed forces is the overwhelming unwillingness to personally 
participate in combat activites. In the last decade of the Cold War, about 40% 
of Germans and Japanese expressed an unwillingness to fight in a war for their 
own country and this number stayed at about the same level throughout the 
1990s (World Value Survey, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005). In the same period, only 
20% of US Americans and about the same percentage of UK citizens shared 
this unwillingness. Between 2000 and 2005, the percentage of those who were 
unwilling to fight in a war for their country among Japanese and Germans 
increased from about 45% to almost 70% in the case of Germany and even 75% 
in the case of Japan. While we could also observe some increase in France, the 
UK and even the US, their levels of unwillingness remained below 40%.
This shows that after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with its increase 
of unconventional forms of combat and terrorist attacks against peacekeeping 
and combat troops including those of Germany, the willingness to personally 
participate has decreased and the willingness to solve these conflicts by other 
means (diplomacy, sanctions, etc.) has increased in Germany as well as in Japan. 
However, this is not a trend we can observe throughout the West. While only 
about 25% of Japanese and 35% of Germans are still willing to fight in a war (if 
necessary), the share is somewhat higher in Italy and Spain (both about 45%), 
significantly higher in the US (68%), and ─ somewhat surprisingly ─ very high 
in Poland and Slovenia (both 75%) and Finland (80%).
These numbers show that Japan is not so unique in its unwillingness to send 
its troops into harms ways, even if the cause and necessity of such a decision 
might be generally accepted. The peculiar history of both countries is reflected 
here; despite the fact that Germany has actually sent significantly more troops 
not only to U.N. peacekeeping missions, but also combat support missions such 
as those in Kosovo.
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There is, however, one interesting difference between Germany and Japan. 
While young Japanese, hence those who would be asked to consider a career in 
the SDF, are significantly less likely to consider fighting for their country (20-
49 year old: 20-30%) than their older age cohorts who had either experienced 
World War II as children or the hardship of the early postwar period (60-79 year 
old: 40-50%), the situation in Germany is exactly the opposite. In Germany, 
between 40% and 50% of those in fighting age could consider fighting in a war, 
whereas this decreases to between 20% and 30% for those over the age of 60. 
These data support earlier data collected by the author (Vosse 2006, 2008), 
which showed a negative correlation between militarist attitudes and age in 
Japan. This seems counter-intuitive, since it is generally assumed that once 
those who have experienced World War II, the pacifist sentiment in the 1950s, 
and the anti-AMPO movements of the 1950s and early 1960s, are those who are 
opposed to a further international engagement of Japan, opposed to the revision 
of article 9, and are less willing to get personally involved to defend their own 
country. While, in fact, the opposite is true. This is a relevant finding because 
it shows that the fear that once the war generation has disappeared, normative 
constraints might weaken and Japan might become more militaristic, have little 
bases.
5. 3  Defense as state priority
Given the choice between economic growths, strong defense forces, 
more say about things, and trying to make cities more beautiful, only 2.5% of 
Germans picked strong defense forces as the first priority of the state. However, 
a significantly higher share, namely 8.7% of the Japanese considered strong 
defense forces as the first priority for Japan. On the one hand, this higher share 
might be a bit surprising when we consider the strong focus on “anti-militarism” 
in the literature of Japanese security identity (Berger 1996, 1998, Katzenstein 
1996), and indeed, even 8.7% is significantly lower than the 32% in the United 
States, but it also shows a coming to terms with a changing security environment 
and a certain “normalization” or re-evaluation of Japan’s international role (all 
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data WWS 2005).
Supporters of the two major political parties are quite close together in their 
general evaluation of the role of armed forces and their willingness to personally 
fight for their country. Although “strong defense forces” have a relatively low 
priority (8.7%) as a state goal for the majority of Japanese, there are some 
differences between supporters of Japanese political parties. Supporting the 
more general assumptions that the two major political parties in Japan tend to 
be moving towards the political center and the “median voter”, public support 
for “strong defense forces” as a state priority is very similar among supporters 
of the LDP (11%) and those of the DPJ (8.6%). The comparison with Germany 
is problematic because of the extremely low preference for strong defense 
forces among the German public (2.2%). The difference between almost all but 
one party “The Left” (Die Linke) is relatively equally distributed (World Value 
Survey 2005-2008).
VI. Conclusion
The original question was whether Japan, twenty years after the end of 
the Cold War, is on its way to become a more active international player. 
Considering the evidence presented above, we can certainly say that Japan has 
begun to be more active and to some degree, a more independent international 
actor than during the Cold War. This paper asked whether we could describe 
this development as “normalization,” and if we can call it that, whether Japan 
is following a specific path. The paper focused on domestic factor, particularly 
changes in public opinion, and compared them with those in post-Cold War 
Germany.
Overall, we could describe the changes in Japan’s foreign and defense policy 
in the Post-Cold War era as “normalization” if we consider the developments 
in Germany after 1990 as “normalization”. Japan and Germany have both gone 
through a “normalization” phase in the sense that their governments reacted to 
international demands from the United Nations after civil wars or humanitarian 
crises. Both the Japanese and the Germans have gradually begun to accept that 
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their countries have to play a larger role. Germany has certainly gone further 
in this regard, considering at times larger contributions to U.N. PKO missions 
to conflict or post-conflict regions, or NATO missions from Kosovo to border 
controls off the coast of Lebanon, and the security and reconstruction missions 
in Afghanistan (ISAF).  
Apart from UN missions and the exceptional case of the Iraq mission, the 
LDP continued to have difficulties in convincing the Japanese public about the 
necessity to participate in more extensive international missions, especially 
those with a higher risk of possible fatalities. A sizable share of the general 
public in Japan as well as Germany consider the conservative parties as more 
closely affiliated with the military infrastructure and perhaps the military 
industry than left of center political parties. The CDU/FDP coalition government 
under Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the 1980s and the 1990s was often suspected 
as being too closely alligned with the United States government, and potentially 
too willing to deploy German armed forces.
In the case of Germany, it was only in 1998, when a Socialist-Green 
coalition government was in power that was generally perceived to be more 
sympathetic to pacifist norms and ideals, which, after weeks and month of 
inner-party and fierce public debate, decided to send German fighter and 
reconnaissance planes to Kosovo. Although this mission was fiercely debated 
in Germany at the time, in the end it was the watershed event that laid the 
groundwork for all the missions Germany is involved in today.
Because it might be better to have a political party in government that was 
not easily accused of always siding with the United States and that did not 
have overly close ties to the military forces, it should be assumed that the DPJ 
government in power in Japan since September 2009 might be better positioned 
than the LDP to pursue a more active security policy agenda and to “convince” 
the Japanese public, that it is now at a stage where the country has to accept 
larger international responsibilities. While each era is different and one cannot 
simply compare what the German left of center coalition decided in 1998 with 
decisions for Japan in 2011 or 2012, the suggestion by the Kan administration 
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in the spring of 2011 to consider sending SDF troops to South Sudan and the 
final deployment of SDF troops to join the UN PKO mission in January 2012 
under Prime Minister Noda can be interpreted as a first indication that the DPJ 
administration is indeed able to make independent security policy decisions that 
include sending SDF troops into potentially more dangerous missions(1). There 
was very little public criticism, which might be an indication not only of public 
support for PKO missions in general, but also of less suspicion against a DPJ 
government. Overall, this could mean more support for Japanese burden-sharing 
in the future.
It has to be said, that the DPJ has not been able to adapt the Japanese PKO law, which prohibits 
Japanese forces to carry heavy arms to protect themselves and troops from other countries. 
This is the reason why the Noda administration only allowed Japanese troops to be deployed 
to the South Sudanese capital of Juba.
(1)
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<Summary>
Wilhelm Vosse
Japan and Germany, two countries with very similar constraints concerning 
their defense and security policy, have often been described as middle power 
or civilian powers. While Germany has began to increase its international role 
first in Europe and later in out-of-area missions, Japan seems to be somehow 
behind Germany and is often described as in the process of “normalization”. 
However, what does “normalization” mean for Japan? Under Prime Minister 
Koizumi, cooperation with the US was intensified and broadened, Japan became 
a partner in the “coalition of the willing” and agreed to co-develop and employ 
a missile defense system. Since 2001, it seemed that even the widely accepted 
belief in the general public support for anti-militarist values was weakening, 
while support to abandon article 9 of the constitution was rising. This article 
argues that Japan, despite some differences in terms of its alliance obligations 
as well as the structure and practice of its political system, has still many 
commonalities with Germany. While Germany has relatively quickly become 
more internationally engaged and has gradually abandoned its overly strong 
unwillingness to send troops abroad after the end of the Cold War, Japan has 
taken longer and is still at the stage Germany might have been in the mid 1990s, 
hence before the Kosovo War. For Japan, public support for its armed forces and 
pride about its achievements over the last ten to fifteen years might indicate an 
increased willingness to play a more active international role, without giving 
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up its still strong preference for non-military and diplomatic solutions in both 
Germany and Japan. Rather than calling them “normal” states, it might be better 
to call them new powers.
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